Poor people in rich countries : the roles of global governance by Scholte, Jan Aart
 University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap 
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information.  
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
Author(s):  Jan Aart Scholte 
Article Title: Poor People in Rich Countries: The Roles of Global 
Governance 
Year of publication: Forthcoming 
Link to published article:  
http://gsp.sagepub.com/ 
Publisher statement: None 
 
1 
 
 
 
POOR PEOPLE IN RICH COUNTRIES 
THE ROLES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
 
Jan Aart Scholte
*
 
 
 
Article accepted for publication in Global Social Policy 
February 2011 
 
 
Abstract 
Connections between global governance and poverty are usually made in relation to what are 
loosely called ‘poor countries’ of the ‘global south’. However, global governance also 
significantly shapes dynamics of impoverishment in ‘rich countries’ of the ‘global north’. 
These impacts become the more apparent when global governance is understood to involve 
not only well-known intergovernmental agencies such as the United Nations and the World 
Trade Organisation, but also additional institutional forms such as transgovernmental 
networks and private regulatory mechanisms. This broad complex of global governance has 
often exacerbated poverty in the global north: e.g., through neglect of the issue; through 
marginalisation of the people affected; and through the promotion of neoliberal policy 
frames. At the same time, global governance has in other ways also promoted poverty 
alleviation in ‘high-income countries’: e.g., with rules that work in their structural favour; 
with policy learning; with rights discourses; and with some promotion of global-scale social 
democracy. Thus the challenge for efforts to reduce poverty in the global north is, on the one 
hand, to counter the negative implications of global governance and, on the other hand, to 
nurture the positive forces. Global coalitions of anti-poverty campaigners – in particular 
across north-south lines – could especially serve these politics. 
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Introduction 
Global governance is often identified as a significant force in generating and/or alleviating 
poverty in the global south. Large libraries of research are available on the role of global 
financial institutions, various United Nations (UN) agencies, the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and other global regulatory bodies with respect to ‘development’ in ‘poor countries’. 
Ten years of publications in Global Social Policy have also contributed substantially to this 
important work. 
In contrast, neither GSP nor social policy studies more generally have had much to 
say about connections between global governance institutions and deprivation in the global 
north. A handful of publications have considered the role of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) on questions of social protection in its member 
countries (McBride and Williams, 2001; Armingeon and Beyeler, 2004; Duina and 
Nedergaard, 2010; Mahon, 2010: 181-8). For the rest, however, the literature has tended to 
presume that social policy in ‘rich countries’ lies wholly in the hands of the respective 
individual national governments (sometimes coupled with regional arrangements, particularly 
in the case of the European Union – see Deacon et al., 2010). Even when analysts have 
related poverty and inequality in the ‘developed world’ to a diffuse global discourse of 
neoliberalism, the accounts have usually not tracked the influence of specific global 
governance institutions on deprivation in ‘advanced economies’ (McBride and Nutt, 2007). 
This omission leaves a gap in knowledge and policy for poverty reduction in the 
global north. True, the involvement of global governance in the dynamics of impoverishment 
in countries such as Japan and the United Kingdom (UK) does not show the same 
institutional patterns as in the global south. For example, in the global north the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) does not provide technical assistance or lend under the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the World Bank are not active in ‘advanced economies’, while agencies such as 
the OECD and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) hold greater prominence. 
However, these different lines of engagement with global governance can in their own way 
still be relevant for the creation and/or reduction of poverty in the ‘developed world’. 
Research that neglects this aspect misses important causal links, and action strategies that 
build on the incomplete research would be suboptimal, if not ineffective. 
To begin to address this gap, the present article sets out an analytical framework for 
considering the relationship between global governance and poverty in ‘rich countries’. The 
first section below sets out a sixfold taxonomy of global governance institutions. This survey 
indicates that planetary-scale regulatory arrangements with relevance to poverty in the global 
north extend much beyond the well-known intergovernmental organisations. The second 
section identifies three general ways that current workings of global governance have 
contributed to the production of poverty in ‘high-income countries’: namely, by overlooking 
the issue; by marginalising poor people; and by furthering neoliberal policies. The third 
section then describes four broad ways that global governance has exerted countervailing 
forces against impoverishment in the global north: namely, by allocating the ‘developed 
world’ disproportionate power and resources; by providing venues for policy learning; by 
promoting rights discourses; and by advancing (albeit only modestly to date) measures 
towards global social democracy. The various positive and negative effects are illustrated 
with reference to concrete circumstances in the UK. Mutatis mutandis the general linkages 
could as well be explored in respect of other countries of the global north. 
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To underline again, the article makes only a start at exploring connections between 
global governance and poverty in ‘developed economies’. For one thing, it is not aspired here 
to develop deeper theory concerning underlying logics of global governance, whether on 
Gramscian, poststructuralist or other lines. In addition, the text does not aim to present a fully 
substantiated empirical argument. Instead, the more modest ambition is, in the vein of mid-
level theory, to map the relevant institutional terrain and to identify broad institutional 
dynamics of global governance that impact on impoverishment in the global north. Such an 
exercise adds value by consolidating insights that have thus far been mostly implicit and 
scattered in the social policy literature. In addition, the framework of analysis developed here 
may assist subsequent efforts at deeper theorising as well as fuller empirical study. 
 
Global Governance 
‘Global governance’ refers here to systems of rules and regulatory processes that apply across 
the planet. Many societal norms, standards and laws today relate to people and places spread 
over the globe. True, global governance arrangements are only rarely completely universal, in 
the sense of touching every human being at every location on earth. However, global regimes 
do apply across multiple continents and/or to so-called ‘global commons’ such as the seas 
and the skies. Moreover, global rules are often administered through regulatory institutions 
whose jurisdiction and constituencies cover much if not all of the earth. 
Needless to say, contemporary global governance does not entail a world state, on the 
model of a nation-state writ large. As current circumstances show, it is quite possible to have 
substantial rules and regulatory institutions that operate on a planetary scale without bringing 
those arrangements together in a unitary, centralised, sovereign apparatus. Instead, present-
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day global governance is dispersed across many often only loosely connected sites, none of 
which holds primacy over the others (even if the UN has sometimes aspired to such a status). 
Nor does global governance negate the nation-state. Certain rash claims of the 1990s 
regarding a purported decline of the state in the face of globalisation (e.g., Ohmae, 1995; 
Strange, 1996) have long been effectively countered (e.g., Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Weiss, 
1998). The state plainly still figures prominently in the construction of social policy (Garrett, 
1998; Yeates, 2001). 
Indeed, it is rather a red herring to seek to measure the relative importance of global 
versus national governance in social policy. Analysis more fruitfully examines the interplay 
and mutual constitution of global and national spheres of regulation (along with regional and 
local arenas). As the account that follows indicates, global governance bodies do not exist as 
a discrete ‘level’, separate from regional, national and local regulatory institutions. Rather, 
the various tiers are thoroughly interpenetrated in transscalar governance networks (Scholte, 
2008). 
This transscalarity is manifest in the various forms of multilateralism that constitute 
contemporary global governance. Some of the agencies are intergovernmental organisations, 
that is, formal bodies based on state membership. Others are transgovernmental networks, 
that is, informal arrangements of global collaboration amongst national regulators. Some are 
interregional apparatuses that bring together officials from different macro-regional units 
such as Europe and Asia. Others are translocal arrangements that assemble substate 
authorities (e.g. provinces and municipalities) from various continents. Still other global 
governance bodies are private regulatory mechanisms in which commercial or civil society 
actors formulate and administer rules. And some are transsectoral constructions (also called 
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multistakeholder forums) that combine elements from official and nonofficial circles. Thus 
global governance has evolved over recent decades to encompass several novel forms in 
addition to traditional ‘international organisations’. As is illustrated in the next paragraphs, 
each of these six institutional types can be relevant to experiences of, and policy responses to, 
poverty in the global north. 
Intergovernmental organisations tend to remain the best-known type of global 
governance arrangement, and many have direct relevance to social policy (Deacon et al., 
1997, 2004; Deacon, 2007; Yeates, 2008). These institutions include household names such 
as the UN and its specialised agencies, among them the IMF and the World Health 
Organisation (WHO). The IMF monitors governments of ‘developed countries’ inter alia on 
conditions relevant to social policy with its annual Article IV surveillance of national 
macroeconomic conditions. The WHO advises all member governments north and south on 
epidemiological matters, including its recommendation in 2009 for mass inoculation against 
swine flu. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) monitors child poverty across the 
world, including in the global north (UNICEF, 2007). The importance of the UN human 
rights machinery for anti-poverty campaigns in ‘rich countries’ is detailed later. 
Outside the UN system, other global intergovernmental organisations with 
implications for the generation and/or alleviation of poverty in the ‘developed world’ include 
the WTO, the BIS, and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Global trade law 
through the WTO deeply shapes patterns of advantage in the world economy, with major 
consequences for (un)employment prospects in ‘advanced economies’. The BIS and 
associated committees set banking standards and other financial rules that affect access to 
bank accounts and credit lines for deprived populations of the global north. Although 
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governments of the global north are not members of the OIC, that organisation declares itself 
to be concerned with the well-being of Muslims anywhere on the planet, so including 
impoverished members of the Ummah resident in the global north (Ihsanoglu, 2010). 
Transgovernmental networks are generally less visible than intergovernmental bodies, 
but arguably these informal collaborations among state officials have on the whole become as 
influential, if not more so, than old-style intergovernmentalism (Slaughter, 2004). Indeed, 
transgovernmentalism has often become a way for states of the north to sideline much of the 
south in global policymaking. The most familiar instances of this institutional form are the 
Group of Eight (G8) and its recently developed close relation, the Group of Twenty (G20). 
Both of these bodies (through their working groups as well as their well-publicised summits) 
coordinate a host of economic and social policies with implications for poverty in the global 
north. Many other transgovernmental relations occur through the 250 committees, working 
groups and expert bodies convened by the OECD (Mahon and McBride, 2008; Martens and 
Jakobi, 2010). OECD gatherings with particular relevance to poverty issues include the 
Economic Policy Committee as well as the Employment, Labour and Social Affairs 
Committee. 
Unfortunately no systematic research has yet been done on the transgovernmental 
relations of social affairs ministries beyond an isolated general analysis (Rhodes, 1990). In 
particular, the specific implications of such engagements for poverty remain to be 
investigated. However, casual observation suggests that transgovernmental links figure 
importantly in social policy. In the UK, for example, the Government Actuary’s Department 
(adviser to the Department for Work and Pensions) links with corresponding offices in 147 
other countries through the International Social Security Association in order to share 
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research results, databases, policy analysis and good practices (ISSA, 2010; also McKinnon, 
2009). (In contrast, UK authorities have thus far not joined agencies from sixty other 
governments worldwide in the International Association of Economic and Social Councils 
and Similar Institutions, AICESIS.) The UK Border Agency maintains memoranda of 
understanding with equivalent bodies in other states in order to coordinate monitoring of 
transboundary migration. One surmises that the UK Department of Health (DH), the 
Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF), and the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) – all with a role in domestic poverty alleviation 
– are also involved in transgovernmental networks that cover their respective agendas, 
although again the relevant research remains to be done. 
Whereas transgovernmental networks are already well embedded today, global 
governance through interregionalism is more incipient. In this vein the European Union (EU) 
has since the 1980s developed collaborations with the Andean Community, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). In an 
instance more specifically relevant to poverty questions, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
has convened interregional conferences of labour and employment ministers in 2006 and 
2008. ASEM has in recent years also organised interregional dialogues on migration and on 
the welfare of women and children (Gilson, 2011). Interregionalism is a trend to watch for 
the future, as the EU grows in importance for social policy, and as EU relations with other 
regional units may develop a larger social dimension. 
Like interregionalism, global governance through translocal networks is largely 
incipient today, although some instances of global links among local councils date back to the 
early twentieth century. The most prominent current instance is United Cities and Local 
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Governments (UCLG), with many members from the global north. UCLG addresses matters 
relevant to poverty inter alia in its Committee on Social Inclusion and Participative 
Democracy as well as its Committee on Gender Equality. Mayors and local counsellors from 
the global north also sit on the UCLG World Council and its Executive Bureau. Town 
twinning is another mode of translocalism where strategies of poverty reduction can be 
advanced, for instance, through the exchange of experiences on social policies. Local (also 
called ‘complementary’) currency schemes with the aim of advancing an egalitarian 
solidarity economy have also pursued some global connections amongst themselves (CC 
Database, 2010). In addition, local authorities and civil society groups in ‘developed 
countries’ have engaged with global networks regarding participatory budgets as a means to 
empower deprived circles (PBU, 2010). 
Although common conception tends to associate governance with the public sector, 
private-sector mechanisms can also fulfil regulatory functions, as the example of local 
currency schemes just given illustrates. Other private global governance of finance occurs 
through industry-based bodies such as the Wolfsberg Group (to combat money laundering) 
and the Hedge Funds Standards Board (HFSB), as well as more informally through the major 
credit rating agencies (Porter, 2005: ch 7; Sinclair, 2005; Underhill and Zhang, 2008). 
Meanwhile the private-sector Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) is a principal site for global communications governance whose operations have 
major implications for digital access (Antonova, 2008). Nonofficial schemes for corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) have proliferated over the past two decades and often address 
poverty-related issues such as labour standards and workplace safety. CSR initiatives have 
sometimes connected global business actors to local poverty alleviation. In another area 
Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO) and the World Fair Trade Organisation 
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(WFTO) uphold rules to ensure that designated commercial arrangements do indeed bring 
greater returns to poor producers (Ullrich, 2011). 
Finally among the six types of global governance distinguished here are transsectoral 
regimes. One long-standing example is the International Labour Organisation (ILO), with its 
tripartite structure of governments, employer federations and trade unions. Another is the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), which brings together commercial 
associations, professional societies, government agencies, universities and individuals. 
Transsectoral constructions have recently multiplied under the label of multistakeholder 
forums. One prominent example, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(GFATM), has a governing board composed of representatives of governments, 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), business, foundations, and people living with the 
diseases. Further new additions include the World Water Council and the Global Partnership 
for Disability and Development. Some transsectoral bodies like the ILO (with its directives 
on employment and labour protection) have direct bearing on poverty in the global north. 
Considering these multiple forms of transplanetary regulation in sum, it is evident that 
global governance is quite substantial in contemporary society. Nowadays every public 
policy issue – including poverty alleviation – is handled partly with global rules and global 
regulatory institutions. Thus an adequate understanding of – and an effective strategy against 
– poverty in the ‘developed world’ today needs to include careful consideration of global 
governance. It is somewhat surprising that a basic mapping exercise such as undertaken in the 
preceding paragraphs has not been done before. 
 
Global Governance and the Production of UK Poverty 
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As various examples above have already indicated, a broad range of global governance 
arrangements can have implications for poverty in the global north. However, rather than 
document these impacts institution by institution, it is more effective to highlight thematic 
ways that global regulatory processes as a whole – across the six categories distinguished 
above – have been involved in the dynamics of impoverishment in ‘rich countries’. The 
various points are illustrated below with examples from the UK. 
It should be stressed from the outset that contemporary global governance has a 
complex relationship to poverty in ‘rich countries’. In some ways, as discussed in the 
following paragraphs, global regulatory arrangements can help to produce and perpetuate 
deprivation. In other ways, as noted in the next section, global rules can contribute to poverty 
reduction. Given this complexity of impacts, one cannot issue either a blanket celebration or a 
total condemnation of global governance with regard to poverty in the global north. Global 
regulation is not inherently beneficial or harmful in this matter. The effects can go either or 
both ways, depending on the nature of the policies that institutions pursue. 
Certainly global governance has had several general downsides for ‘developed world’ 
poverty in contemporary history. Three such negative consequences are elaborated below, 
with illustrations from the UK: (a) the problem of omission; (b) the problem of 
marginalisation; and (c) the problem of neoliberal policy frames. 
Omission 
The problem of omission refers here to the tendency in much of global governance to 
approach poverty as a concern of the global south, thereby largely neglecting poverty in the 
global north. Indeed, the prevailing vocabulary in global policy circles characterises the UK 
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as a ‘rich country’, thereby tending to render invisible the poor inside its borders. To be sure, 
it is in many ways understandable that the World Bank, UNICEF, the GFATM and the 
WFTO have concentrated their attentions on so-called ‘least developed countries’ where 
poverty runs deeper and local resources to combat it are more limited. However, this focus on 
the ‘third world’ has often gone so far that these global governance institutions underplay if 
not completely ignore poverty in so-called ‘advanced economies’ such as the UK. 
With this general oversight UK governments have not faced the sorts of pressures to 
tackle poverty issues that many global regulatory bodies have insistently put on governments 
of ‘low-income countries’. Thus urgings of the UN Development Decades from the 1960s to 
the 1990s and the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) since 2000 have not applied 
to social policy in the UK. Likewise, the G8 has addressed poverty as an issue for the 
‘developing countries’ rather than as a problem for its own member states. The IMF, too, has 
seen poverty reduction as a priority in ‘low-income countries’ and not as a headline subject 
for its Article IV consultations in the UK. With this diversion of attention global governance 
bodies have in effect let governments of the global north (including the UK) off the hook 
concerning their domestic poverty. An exception to this overall pattern is UNICEF with its 
aforementioned critiques of childhood poverty in the UK and other ‘rich countries’ 
(UNICEF, 2007). 
Campaigners against UK poverty have tended to be complicit in this omission 
inasmuch as their advocacy has given global governance limited attention. True, development 
NGOs working out of the UK have often lobbied global regulatory agencies on poverty 
issues, but with a focus on the global south rather than their home country. Meanwhile groups 
that combat poverty in the UK have rarely taken their advocacy beyond ministries in London, 
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although some engage regionally with the EU through initiatives such as the European Anti-
Poverty Network (EAPN). Global governance has generally been a blind spot for activists on 
UK poverty, in spite of its potential benefits to their cause. 
Illustrating this neglect of global governance, NGOs dealing with social welfare in the 
UK have generally not pursued consultative status at the UN. The few exceptions include 
Help the Aged, the International Network of Street Papers, and the Salvation Army 
(UNDESA, 2010). Consultative status allows attendance of, and sometimes also speaking 
rights at, a broad range of UN meetings, including committees concerned with economic and 
social affairs (Willetts, 2000). Some NGOs have via these channels affected the texts of UN 
resolutions and recommendations as well as the execution of some UN programmes with 
relevance to poverty, but in the global south. Likewise, few civil society advocates for the 
UK poor have participated in ad hoc UN conferences concerned with poverty issues, such as 
the World Summit for Social Development, its sequels, and the social watch reports that have 
monitored implementation of summit action plans since the mid-1990s. Civil society 
accreditation is also available at meetings of the Commonwealth, the IMF, the OECD and the 
WTO. 
Nor have campaigns against poverty in the UK built strong coalitions with anti-
poverty groups in ‘less developed’ world regions. Such alliances might engage global 
governance institutions as a collective north-south force. A number of UK-based groups have 
participated in the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP), but again this activity has 
focused almost entirely on poverty in the global south (Sireau, 2009). GCAP could also be 
connected more with impoverishment within the UK itself and link the struggles of people 
living with poverty north and south. Similar comments could apply to the Global Campaign 
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for Education (GCE) (Gaventa and Mayo, 2010). The UK poor could also increase links with 
global self-help networks such as the International Alliance of Inhabitants (IAI), StreetNet 
International, and Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO). 
Marginalisation 
The expansion of global governance in recent history has also reinforced poverty in the UK 
to the extent that poor people have had little access to, or influence in, most planetary-scale 
regulatory agencies. It is harder to advance one’s cause when one lacks entry to sites of 
power, and most global governance bodies are currently largely closed to poor people, both in 
the UK and elsewhere. 
In a sense these democratic failings have put back the historical clock for anti-poverty 
movements. Similar exclusions once faced the poor in relation to the nation-state, but then 
long struggles by trade unions, cooperative associations and others by the middle of the 
twentieth century gave impoverished groups more say in the UK government. The state 
responded with a waft of redistributive social legislation that substantially alleviated poverty 
in the UK. Now the rise of elite-dominated global governance in recent decades has tipped 
the scales back once again towards greater political marginalisation of poor people. 
Global governance institutions as they are constructed today generally offer few 
channels of participation for the poor. In contrast to nation-states, planetary regulatory bodies 
lack a popularly elected legislative arm where the poor might find representation. Instead, 
intergovernmental organisations are bastions of diplomats and technocrats who are far 
removed from – and have only the thinnest accountability to – impoverished people. 
Similarly, transgovernmental networks are usually closed shops of bureaucrats who have no 
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interchange of note with poor constituents (Slaughter, 2004: ch 6). Meanwhile most private 
global governance is invisible as well as inaccessible to the poor and their advocates in faith-
based groups, NGOs, trade unions and other social movements. 
True, many global regulatory organisations have in recent decades joined the ILO in 
opening certain channels for the consultation of civil society associations (Scholte, 2011). 
The World Bank and the IMF have since 1999 promoted Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) whose preparation often involves considerable inputs from civil society 
organisations. However, PRSPs relate to ‘low-income countries’, and anti-poverty groups in 
‘developed countries’ such as the UK have acquired few opportunities for substantive 
involvement in global policymaking. Moreover, apart from the World Bank (which gives no 
attention to UK poverty), most global governance bodies have allocated few staff and funds 
for civil society liaison. On their side most campaigners against UK poverty have lacked the 
resources to conduct meaningful sustained engagement of global regulatory agencies. Hence 
it has been exceptional that, for example, ATD Fourth World has facilitated the participation 
of several poor persons from the UK to give testimony at the UN (ATD Fourth World, 2009: 
3). Instead, global governance consultation of civil society has mainly involved business 
associations, think tanks and large professional NGOs, with little space for participation by 
marginalised social circles. Hence, while welcome in principle, initiatives for civil society 
engagement in global regulation have in practice done little so far to close accountability gaps 
vis-à-vis poor people in the UK. 
Neoliberalism 
When global governance involves little recognition, voice or influence for the poor, the 
resulting rules are less likely to work against poverty alleviation and may on the contrary 
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actually exacerbate it. Many critics have issued such a charge against the neoliberal policy 
framework that dominated in global regulation during the late twentieth century and 
continues to linger in recent years. Indeed, the strength of the paradigm has been such that 
many commentators have equated ‘globalisation’ with ‘liberalisation’, as though the two 
were the same thing, and as though neoliberal principles are the only way to govern a more 
global world.  
Neoliberalism can be understood as a policy formula that prescribes globalisation by 
laissez-faire marketisation (Scholte, 2005: 38-41; Harvey, 2005; Robison, 2006). This 
perspective tends to define society (and poverty within society) in wholly economic terms. As 
its optimal approach to economy neoliberalism prescribes free-market capitalism, a societal 
order that will allegedly not only end poverty, but also advance democracy, liberty and peace. 
To move towards this good society, neoliberalism urges liberalisation (the removal of 
statutory barriers to cross-border transactions), deregulation (the annulment of legal measures 
that constrain market capitalist initiative), and privatisation (the transfer of publicly held 
assets to private ownership). In addition, the neoliberal framework emphasises fiscal 
constraint to limit public sector expenditure and tight monetary policy to avoid inflation. 
Global governance agencies played a pivotal role in the generation and spread of 
neoliberal policy discourses during the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, the so-called ‘Washington 
Consensus’ on the need for laissez faire in the globalising economy referred to the location of 
IMF and World Bank headquarters (as well as the seat of the US Government) (Williamson, 
1990). The WTO, the G8 and the OECD also strongly promoted neoliberal policies, and by 
the 1990s much UN activity in the area of economic and social policy had also taken a 
substantial neoliberal turn (Thérien, 1999; Wilkinson, 2006; Hajnal, 2007; Mahon and 
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McBride, 2008). The rise of private mechanisms for global economic governance in the late 
twentieth century further embraced the logic of market-centred development (Graz and 
Nölke, 2008; Hansen and Salskov-Iversen, 2008). 
Of course national governments in the UK at this time were also of a strong neoliberal 
bent and hardly needed persuasion from global governance agencies to adopt this policy 
frame. In fact the Thatcher and Major governments used their positions in intergovernmental 
and transgovernmental forums to promote neoliberalism in the wider world. Still, support 
from global economic regimes reinforced the power of neoliberalism in the UK during the 
1980s and 1990s and also made it more difficult for UK policymakers to turn away from that 
course after the change of ruling party in 1997. Thus ‘New Labour’ arguably remained under 
strong neoliberal influences in part owing to the resilience of this paradigm in key global 
governance circles where national governments are socialised into global norms. 
The implications of neoliberalism for poverty are much contested. Advocates of the 
approach affirm that it minimises poverty and maximises aggregate prosperity. For supporters 
of neoliberalism, ‘free’ markets boost efficiency and output, generating high economic 
growth that sooner or later raises the welfare of all, including the poor. In contrast, opponents 
of laissez faire charge that neoliberalism is an ideology of the strong that in practice 
exacerbates deprivation of the disadvantaged and widens inequalities between rich and poor. 
In the eyes of critics, liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation transfer power and 
resources to propertied classes. At the same time fiscal constraint reduces social protections, 
and tight monetary policy disproportionately favours people with finance capital (whereas 
deficit spending with mild inflationary effects could be used to expand social programmes 
and associated poverty reduction). 
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The present article is not the place for a full dissection of evidence relevant to the 
consequences of neoliberalism for poverty in the UK. However, it is certainly incontestable 
that considerable impoverishment has persisted in the country over the years that neoliberal 
principles have prevailed. In particular UK poverty has continued in areas of mining and old 
industry that have struggled to achieve ‘competitiveness’ in a more ‘open’ global economy. 
Meanwhile, as in most other countries that have adopted neoliberal policies, income and asset 
inequalities have grown in the UK since the 1970s (Cornia and Court, 2001). The polarisation 
is particularly stark in London, where enormous stocks of globally mobile capital sit 
alongside some of the largest concentrations of UK poverty. 
Unhappiness at continued poverty and widening inequality – coupled with perceptions 
that these circumstances have resulted from neoliberal policies – spurred increased resistance 
to this paradigm, particularly in the late 1990s and early years of the new century. Largely in 
response to this opposition, the reigning policy discourse in global governance has over the 
past decade shifted from laissez faire to what might be termed a ‘global social market’ 
approach. Under this revised orientation the central thrust of global public policy remains to 
promote economic welfare through market forces. Hence talk in some quarters of a ‘Post-
Washington Consensus’ exaggerates the degree of policy reorientation (Stiglitz, 1998). 
However, the altered perspective does hold that laissez faire can cause harms in some 
situations, including for vulnerable social groups, and that corrective interventions from 
official, business and civil society circles are warranted in these circumstances. In this sense 
the global social market framework can suitably be termed an ‘Augmented Washington 
Consensus’ (Rodrik, 2001). 
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Various global governance measures of the past decade – including a number that 
directly address poverty – reflect a global social market outlook. In this vein the UN MDGs 
have committed governments to major reductions in poverty by 2015. The IMF and World 
Bank have recast what were previously known as ‘structural adjustment programmes’ in a 
new vocabulary of ‘poverty reduction strategies’. In recognition that markets cannot deliver 
all welfare by themselves, talk of ‘global public goods’ has spread across global economic 
governance (Kaul, 2003). On social market lines the ILO has promoted an agenda of ‘decent 
work’ in a globalising economy (WCSDG, 2004). With a proliferation of CSR schemes 
global business is meant to work more deliberately against poverty as well (Jenkins, 2005). 
However, as noted earlier, this heightened attention in global governance to proactive 
anti-poverty measures has applied mainly to ‘low-income countries’ rather than to ‘advanced 
economies’ such as the UK. Global regulatory agencies have rarely if ever highlighted 
poverty issues in respect of the UK, let alone pressed Westminster or Whitehall to adopt 
particular social policy initiatives. That said, the general shift towards a social market 
discourse globally has perhaps set a backdrop that has encouraged the pursuit of ‘Caring 
Conservatism’ and ‘New Labour’ in the UK since the late 1990s. Most recently the tendency 
has been manifested in David Cameron’s promotion of a ‘wellbeing index’. If global 
governance had continued a strong promotion of neoliberalist policies into the twenty-first 
century it would arguably have been more difficult for UK governments to run against the 
grain with a social market approach. 
To be sure, the adequacy of a global social market formula for poverty alleviation is a 
matter for debate. Critics argue that the turn to greater social sensitivity is not sufficient so 
long as an underlying promotion of market capitalism remains. Certainly a decade of New 
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Labour did not halve poverty in the UK any more than the MDGs are on course to halve 
poverty in ‘low-income countries’ by 2015. To this extent more ambitious reorientations of 
global governance policies might be required in order to make deeper and more lasting 
inroads against poverty in the UK and elsewhere. 
 
Global Governance and the Alleviation of UK Poverty 
As noted earlier, not all effects of global governance on poverty in ‘rich countries’ are 
negative. On the contrary, transplanetary regimes have also exerted some countervailing 
forces against impoverishment in the global north. One such ‘positive’ impact is rather 
suspect, inasmuch as it flows from the disproportionate power that the ‘developed world’ 
(including the UK) has long exerted in a number of global regimes. Less problematically, 
global governance offers other positive potentials for poverty alleviation in ‘rich countries’ in 
terms of: (a) providing venues for policy learning; (b) advancing rights discourses; and (c) 
promoting global-scale social democracy. 
Disproportionate power 
Global governance has advantaged efforts to combat poverty in ‘advanced economies’ such 
as the UK to the extent that actors from these areas have exerted disproportionate influence in 
these regimes. For example, the UK is only one amongst more than 200 countries in the 
world, and its population accounts for less than 1 per cent of humanity. Yet from this small 
minority position UK governments have for 65 years held one of five permanent seats with 
veto power on the UN Security Council as well as pivotal positions with substantial votes on 
the Boards of the IMF and the World Bank. UK governments have also had membership in 
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elite clubs of states such as the G8, the OECD and the BIS. Colonial history has given UK 
governments a leading role in the Commonwealth. In addition, London has hosted the 
headquarters of various private global governance agencies, particularly in the area of 
finance. 
From such privileged positions UK-based actors have been able to craft global rules 
that tend unduly to advantage the country in the world distribution of resources. For example, 
by holding a prominent position in the global monetary order the pound sterling has generally 
given UK residents better exchange rates and higher purchasing power than populations of 
countries with more marginal currencies. Likewise, WTO rules inter alia on services and 
intellectual property have broadly worked to the disproportionate benefit of UK-based 
producers. The global non-proliferation regime has sustained the UK position as one of a 
handful of states with nuclear weapons. Private global governance has reinforced the central 
UK role in global finance, helping to bring massive flows of capital from across the planet to 
the City of London. In these ways and more, global governance has been an important factor 
in preserving a high ranking for the UK in international comparisons of per capita income. 
Of course these advantages to the UK in the international distribution of resources 
could have been exploited to better effect in combating poverty within the country. The 
persistence of impoverishment inside the UK has largely resulted from national and local 
government policies. Thus some other countries with levels of per capita GDP similar to the 
UK have lower poverty thanks in good part to economic and social policies that promote a 
more even distribution of resources across their population. With a Gini coefficient of around 
34 the UK has one of the higher income inequalities in the EU and is on this measure more 
comparable with Egypt or Spain than with Germany or Sweden (CIA, 2010). 
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Pressures on the UK poor could well grow as the country’s privileged positions in 
global governance are eroded in the coming years and decades. Opposition grows to global 
regulatory arrangements that are widely regarded as undemocratic and unjust legacies of a 
colonialist Euro-centric world order. Already memberships of the G8, the OECD and the BIS 
are expanding and leaving the UK in a relatively less prominent role. The old EU-US axis at 
the heart of WTO trade negotiations has in recent years expanded to a Quad that also includes 
Brazil and India, with China playing an increasingly active part as well. Votes in the Bretton 
Woods institutions have since 2006 been reallocated three times towards so-called ‘emerging 
economies’, and it is probably only a matter of time before the UK seat on the IMF and 
World Bank Executive Boards is absorbed into a collective EU representation. Already EU 
positions at the IMF are collectively discussed through the Sub-Committee on IMF Matters 
(SCIMF) in Brussels and the informal ‘EURIMF’ gathering in Washington (Nicolas, 2006). 
Nor is the pre-eminence of London in global financial markets guaranteed forever. It is 
therefore quite likely that advantages from the political economy of global governance which 
have flowed to the UK over the past century will be considerably reduced in the coming 
generation or two. 
The loss of these privileges could rebound negatively on poverty in the UK, 
particularly if the gains previously achieved through political advantage in global governance 
are not matched through productivity increases. Alternatively, or at the same time, increased 
pressures on the UK poor from power shifts in global regulation could be countered with 
state policies of more progressive redistribution of resources across the national population. 
However, a move towards deeper social democracy would require a major recalibration of 
UK politics, and the broader electorate might well resist such reallocations of national 
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resources to the poor at a time when the country is in relative decline within the global 
economy. 
Policy learning 
Whereas advantages to poverty alleviation in the UK that accrue from the country’s history of 
arbitrary privilege in global governance could be seen as morally rather dubious, no 
fundamental ethical doubts need surround a second type of potential benefit, namely, that of 
collective learning. Global governance institutions provide many opportunities for sharing 
lessons and good practices across countries and their governments. If done well, the resultant 
transfer of policy ideas and instruments can promote more effective strategies to counter 
poverty (Duina and Nedergaard, 2010). 
Many of the global governance processes reviewed earlier in this discussion provide 
venues for learning and transfer in respect of social policies in the UK. Ministers, 
parliamentarians, officials, consultants, businesspeople and civil society actors from the UK 
constantly participate in relevant UN commissions and conferences, OECD committees, G8 
summits, ASEM gatherings and UCLG meetings. These ongoing exchanges of knowledge 
generate global ‘epistemic communities’ of policy expertise (Haas, 1992). 
To be sure, it is not helpful to diffuse failed practices in respect of poverty alleviation; 
nor should principles and mechanisms that succeeded in one context be applied to another 
situation where they are inappropriate (Hulme, 2005). Policies on education, employment, 
health, participation and welfare that work positively in, say, Sweden or the USA might not 
play out successfully against poverty in the UK. Likewise, certain harms of neoliberalism for 
poverty in the UK and elsewhere have resulted because broad ideological premises were 
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spread from one country to the next without due attention to contextual specificities. 
However, if pursued with care and sensitivity, policy learning and transfer through global 
governance processes can have beneficial effects for poverty reduction. 
Rights discourses 
A further positive effect of global governance on UK poverty comes through the discourse of 
economic and social rights that UN agencies in particular have promoted since the 1970s. 
Whereas the historical paradigm of human rights in the UK has emphasised civil and political 
freedoms, global governance norms emanating from the UN system have equally stressed 
economic, social and cultural requisites of a decent life. The global human rights apparatus 
has thereby offered an important discursive and legal resource for anti-poverty campaigners 
in the UK. 
A host of UN institutions and instruments are relevant in respect of economic and 
social rights (Bayefsky, 2010). The UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has been in force since 1976. Other UN treaties with provisions regarding 
adequate or decent standards of living include the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1981), the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1990), the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families (2003), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (2008). Implementation of each convention is monitored and evaluated by a 
specially designated committee of experts. These committees, most of which meet in Geneva, 
are serviced by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. In addition, the 
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ILO oversees 188 global conventions regarding labour standards, many of which have a 
bearing on poverty. 
The development and implementation of these various global governance instruments 
for economic and social rights have helped to shift policy frames worldwide in favour of 
poverty alleviation. In this vein discourses of security have moved away from a heavily 
military-strategic mode (as prevailed in the mid-twentieth century) towards a ‘human 
security’ paradigm that inter alia places poverty eradication at its core. The much-cited 
‘human development indicators’ calculated by UNDP since 1990 in respect of all countries 
including the UK likewise reinforces a global priority on poverty reduction that encourages 
anti-poverty work in the UK. 
In addition to this general policy framing effect, the global human rights machinery 
offers specific channels to lobby for national policy change in respect of poverty alleviation. 
With a ‘boomerang effect’, citizens can work through global venues to alter state policies 
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998). For example, civil society associations have the possibility to 
submit reports to UN human rights committees that supplement and possibly contest the 
accounts that their national government prepares. On these lines some 30 UK citizen groups 
supplied shadow reports to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in 2009 (CESCR, 2009; Donald and Mottershaw, 2009: 25-7). Amongst these, a 
submission from the Scottish Human Rights Commission drew attention inter alia to issues 
of inadequate housing and health inequalities (SHRC, 2009). In another example, certain 
women’s associations such as the Fawcett Society have fed into shadow reports to monitor 
UK government compliance with CEDAW (Fawcett, 2010: 5, 33). In addition, individual 
women can petition the CEDAW Committee under the Optional Protocol, although few are 
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aware of this possibility (Bird, 2010). Similarly, trade unions and other civil society groups 
can take relevant complaints about working conditions and poverty in the UK to the various 
supervisory bodies that oversee the ILO conventions. Arguably UK activists could make 
more use of these ‘boomerang’ tactics in their anti-poverty campaigns. 
Global social democracy 
Another move along boomerang lines that could advance anti-poverty efforts in the UK is the 
promotion of global social democracy. As seen earlier, global neoliberalism facilitated the 
rise of laissez faire policies in the UK during the 1980s, and global social market discourses 
subsequently encouraged the rise of corrective policy interventions on poverty in the UK. 
Similarly, a turn towards a global social democracy paradigm could encourage a shift towards 
progressive redistribution and active political participation as a more ambitious anti-poverty 
strategy in the UK and the global economy generally. Thus, much as social democracy 
through the state helped to counter poverty in nationally centred capitalism at an earlier 
historical juncture, so social democracy through global governance could counter poverty in 
more globalised capitalism at the present time. 
Certain (albeit on the whole still limited) measures in the vein of global social 
democracy have already been pursued. For example, the Bretton Woods institutions and the 
G8 have cancelled a number of unsustainable external debts of various low-income countries. 
In addition, private-sector fair trade schemes which have proliferated since the 1990s seek to 
redistribute gains from global commerce in favour of poor producers in poor countries. Of 
more relevance to poverty in the UK, transgovernmental networks in G8 and OECD contexts 
have in recent years intensified efforts to reduce tax evasion through offshore finance centres, 
steps that can reduce income inequalities in ‘rich countries’ as well as increase government 
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revenues for social programmes. The global financial crisis of 2007-8 has revived (albeit 
perhaps only briefly) discussion, including at the IMF, of a currency transaction tax that 
could generate very substantial funds inter alia for social protection (Claessens, 2010). Other 
proposals on the lines of global social democracy that could benefit the UK poor include a 
global anti-trust policy (pursued in incipient form since 2001 through the transgovernmental 
International Competition Network) that would better curb the power of global companies 
vis-à-vis vulnerable consumers (ICN, 2011). In addition, the establishment of a Global 
Mobility Organisation could bring greater formalisation, stability and equity to the position of 
poor migrants in the UK and elsewhere (Ghosh, 2000). 
Yet, although global-scale social democracy holds various prospective benefits for 
poverty alleviation, to date little civil society action on UK poverty has engaged with this 
agenda of more ambitious global governance reform. A number of UK-based development 
NGOs have promoted ideas and proposals in the vein of global social democracy in their 
campaigns against poverty in the global south. However, groups that work for poverty 
reduction through greater social democracy within the UK itself have generally not given 
their activism a global dimension. For example, such advocates could collaborate more 
intensively with the Tax Justice Network to address abuses of non-domicile status and 
offshore finance by wealthy circles in the UK. Similarly, activists on UK poverty could more 
concertedly back initiatives for more public-interest global regulation of transnational 
corporations. Advocates could also engage debates on global financial taxes in order to draw 
attention to their potential benefits for anti-poverty work in ‘rich countries’ such as the UK. 
By absenting themselves from these activities, campaigners on UK poverty weaken the 
momentum for global social democracy and also reduce the chances that, to the extent that 
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this paradigm does gain ground, it is made to work for poverty alleviation in the global north 
as well as the global south. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has identified a host of ways that global governance is relevant to poverty in the 
global north. Overall, the analysis has suggested that global governance has figured both 
negatively and positively in this respect. The political challenge is therefore, on the one hand, 
to counter the three broad adverse implications of current global governance arrangements 
identified earlier and, on the other hand, to build up the potentials for poverty reduction 
effects. A key move in these politics is arguably to forge stronger coalitions across north-
south lines among persons living with poverty. 
Where, then, are the key points for campaigners to engage global governance on 
issues of poverty in ‘rich countries’? In terms of shaping broad economic and social policy 
discourses (such as neoliberal, global social market, and global social democracy paradigms), 
the main relevant global governance sites are the G8, the OECD, the ILO and certain 
transgovernmental venues such as AICESIS and the ISSA. Anti-poverty advocates would do 
well to monitor activities in these quarters and to intervene at strategic decision points. The 
IMF also figures in the production of macroeconomic policy discourses, and civil society 
groups could seek to participate in the Fund’s general strategic thinking as well as its 
country-specific annual Article IV consultations (as has happened in Switzerland, for 
example). However, governments in ‘advanced economies’ have usually taken little heed of 
IMF analysis and advice, which have generally tended to impact more in the global south 
(IEO, 2009). For the rest, campaigners against poverty in ‘rich countries’ can engage 
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supportively with global governance arenas that push a global social democracy agenda, 
including fair trade schemes, the Commonwealth, and parts of the UN system. 
In terms of specific anti-poverty policies, the main global governance venues to 
engage vary depending on the issue. In respect of child poverty, for instance, activists would 
best turn to UNICEF and the UN human rights machinery. Regarding gender and poverty the 
main sites would be relevant UN agencies (regrouped in July 2010 as UN Women) and 
possibly also the UCLG gender equality committee. In relation to employment and labour 
standards (including for vulnerable migrant workers) the principal global places to go are the 
ILO, the OECD, the UN Committee on Migrant Workers, and various CSR arrangements. 
CSR frameworks can also be engaged on consumer protection issues for socially vulnerable 
circles. To advocate digital inclusion of people living in poverty the main site of global 
regulation is ICANN. To promote pro-poor financial regulation attention could be given to 
the OECD, the BIS, the IMF, the G8/G20 and various private global regulatory mechanisms. 
Concerning tax justice the indicated principal global governance venue is the OECD. As 
noted earlier, many global governance agencies now have formal channels in place for civil 
society participation in their proceedings. Where such arrangements are absent or wanting, 
alternative tactics including informal contacts and public demonstrations can be pursued. 
In any engagement of global governance poverty activists in the global north would 
do well to move in solidarity with similarly minded civil society groups from the global 
south. Activism on global issues gains greater force through global movements, including 
across north-south lines. Indeed, such divisions are in any case becoming ever more artificial 
with the advent of so-called ‘emerging economies’. Opportunities for north-south 
collaboration on poverty such as GCAP and GCE have already been noted. The World Social 
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Forum also provides major openings to assemble anti-poverty groups from all corners of the 
planet. So do the civil society meetings that nowadays convene alongside UN and WTO 
conferences; IMF/World Bank meetings; G8, OECD and Commonwealth summits; and 
ASEM gatherings. Global governance logically calls forth global civil society, and advocates 
against poverty in ‘rich countries’ could strengthen their cause in a more global world by 
further globalising their own networks. 
True, in such alliances campaigners against poverty in the north would need to 
acknowledge and confront global governance arrangements that have historically given 
structural advantage to their parts of the world. Indeed, by keeping distance from 
‘development’ campaigns for ‘poor countries’, activists on poverty in ‘rich countries’ might 
be viewed by their counterparts in the global south as implicitly sustaining existing injustices. 
Thus building north-south coalitions on poverty eradication requires some sensitive listening 
and delicate negotiation among parties with hitherto underdeveloped collaboration. Yet 
already other disadvantaged groups such as peasants, persons with disabilities, and sexual 
minorities have achieved greater political confidence and influence through global 
networking in, for example, Vía Campesina, Disabled Peoples’ International, and the 
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association. If constructed with care 
bottom-up north-south alliances of the poor could create a powerful civil society force for 
more equitable global governance. 
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